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Abstract. We propose a simple global computing framework, whose main concern is
code migration. Systems are structured in sites, and each site is divided into two parts: a
computing body, and a membrane which regulates the interactions between the computing
body and the external environment. More precisely, membranes are ﬁlters which control
access to the associated site, and they also rely on the well-established notion of trust
between sites. We develop a basic theory to express and enforce security policies via
membranes. Initially, these only control the actions incoming agents intend to perform
locally. We then adapt the basic theory to encompass more sophisticated policies, where
the number of actions an agent wants to perform, and also their order, are considered.
1. Introduction
Computing is increasingly characterised by the global scale of applications and the
ubiquity of interactions between mobile components. Among the main features of the forth-
coming “global ubiquitous computing” paradigm we list distribution and location awarness,
whereby code located at speciﬁc sites acts appropriately to local parameters and circum-
stances, that is, it is “context-aware”; mobility, whereby code is dispatched from site to site
to increase ﬂexibility and expressivity; openness, reﬂecting the nature of global networks
and embodying the permeating hypothesis of localised, partial knowledge of the execution
environment. Such systems present enormous diﬃculties, both technical and conceptual,
and are currently more at the stage of exciting future prospectives than that of established
of engineering practice. Two concerns, however, appear to clearly have a ever-reaching
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import: security and mobility control, arising respectively from openness and from massive
code and resource migrations. They are the focus of the present paper.
We aim at classifying mobile components according to their behaviour, and at empow-
ering sites with control capabilities which allow them to deny access to those agents whose
behaviour does not conform to the site’s policy. We see every site of a system
k[[ M |  P ]]
as an entity named k and structured in two layers: a computing body P, where programs
run their code – possibly accessing local resources oﬀered by the site – and a membrane M,
which regulates the interactions between the computing body and the external environment.
An agent P wishing to enter a site l must be veriﬁed by the membrane before it is given a
chance to execute in l. If the preliminary check succeeds, the agent is allowed to execute,
otherwise it is rejected. In other words, a membrane implements the policy each site wants
to enforce locally, by ruling on the requests of access of the incoming agents. This can be
easily expressed by a migration rule of the form:
k[[ Mk |  gol.P | Q ]]   l[[ Ml |  R ]] → k[[ Mk |  Q ]]   l[[ Ml |  P | R ]] if Ml ⊢k P
The relevant parts here are P, the agent wishing to migrate from k to l, and l, the receiving
site, which needs to be satisﬁed that P’s behaviour complies with its policy. The latter
is expressed by l’s membrane, Ml. The judgement Ml ⊢k P represents l inspecting the
incoming code to verify that it upholds Ml.
Observe that in the formulation above Ml ⊢k P represents a runtime check of all
incoming agents. Because of our fundamental assumption of openendedness, such kind of
checks, undesirable as they might be, cannot be avoided. In order to reduce their impact on
systems performance, and to make the runtime semantics as eﬃcient as possible, we adopt
a strategy which allows for eﬃcient agent veriﬁcation. Precisely, we adopt an elementary
notion of trust, so that from the point of view of each l the set of sites is consistently
partitioned between “good,” “bad,” and “unknown” sites. Then, in a situation like the
one in the rule above, we assume that l will be willing to accept from a trusted site k a
k-certiﬁed digest T of P’s behaviour. We then modify the primitive go and the judgement
⊢k as in the reﬁned migration rule:
k[[ Mk |  goTl.P | Q ]]   l[[ Ml |  R ]] → k[[ Mk |  Q ]]   l[[ Ml |  P |R ]] if Ml ⊢k
T P
The notable diﬀerence is in Ml ⊢k
T P. Here, l veriﬁes the entire code P against Ml only if
it does not trust k, the signer of P’s certiﬁcate T. Otherwise, it suﬃces for l to match Ml
against the digest T carried by go together with P from k, so eﬀectively shifting work from
l to the originator of P.
Our main concern in this paper is to put the focus on the machinery a membrane should
implement to enforce diﬀerent kinds of policies. We ﬁrst distill the simplest calculus which
can conceivably convey our ideas and still support a non-trivial study. It is important to
remark that we are abstracting from agents’ local computations. These can be expressed
in any of several well-known models for concurrency, for example CCS [Mil82] or the π–
calculus [Mil99]. We are concerned, instead, with agents’ migration from site to site: our
main language mechanism is go rather than intra-site (i.e. local) communication. Using this
language, we examine four notions of policy and show how they can be enforced by using
membranes. We start with an amusingly simple policy which only lists allowed actions.
We then move to count action occurrences and then to policies expressed by deterministic
ﬁnite automata. Note that such policies are only concerned with the behaviour of singleSECURITY POLICIES AS MEMBRANES IN SYSTEMS FOR GLOBAL COMPUTING 3
agents, and do not take into account “coalitional” behaviours, whereby incoming agents –
apparently innocent – join clusters of resident agents – they too apparently innocent – to
perform cooperatively potentially harmful actions, or at least overrule the host site’s policy.
We call resident those policies intended to be applied to the joint, composite behaviour of
the agents contained at a site. We explore resident policies as our fourth and ﬁnal notion of
policy. In all the cases, the theory adapts smoothly; we only need to reﬁne the information
stored in the membrane and the inspection mechanisms.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2 we deﬁne the calculus used in this paper, and start
with the straightforward policy which only prescribes the actions an agent can perform
when running in a site. In Section 3, we enhance the theory to control also how many (and
not only which kind of) actions an agent wants to perform in a site, and their order of
execution. Finally, in Section 4 we extend the theory to control the overall computation
taking place at a site, and not only the behaviour of single agents. The paper concludes in
Section 5 where a comparison with related work is also given. The theoretical results are
proved in Appendix A. With respect to the extended abstract [GHS04], this paper contains
more examples together with complete proofs.
2. A Simple Calculus
In this section we describe a simple calculus for mobile agents, which may migrate
between sites. Each site is guarded by a membrane, whose task is to ensure that every
agent accepted at the site conforms to an entry policy.
2.1. The Syntax.
The syntax is given in Figure 1 and assumes two pairwise disjoint sets: basic agent actions
Act, ranged over by a,b,c,   , and localities Loc, ranged over by l,k,h,   . Agents
are constructed using the standard action-preﬁxing, parallel composition and replication
operators from process calculi, [Mil82]. The one novel operator is that for migration,
goTl.P
This agent seeks to migrate to site l in order to execute the code P; moreover it promises
to conform to the entry policy T. In practical terms this might consist of a certiﬁcation
that the incoming code P conforms to the policy T, which the site l has to decide whether
or not to accept. In our framework, this certiﬁcation is a policy that describes the (local)
behaviour of the agent; thus, in goTl.P, T will be called the digest of P.
A system consists of a ﬁnite set of sites running in parallel. A site takes the form
l[[ M |  P ]]
where
• l is the site name
• P is the code currently running at l
• M is the membrane which implements the entry policy.
For convenience we assume that site names are unique in systems. Thus, in a given system
we can identify the membrane associated with the site named l by Ml. We start with a
very simple kind of policy, which we will then progressively enhance.4 D. GORLA, M. HENNESSY, AND V. SASSONE
Basic Actions a,b,c,... ∈ Act
Localities l,h,k,... ∈ Loc
Agents P,Q,R ::= nil nil agent
| a.P basic action
| goTl.P migration
| P | Q composition
| !P replication
Systems N ::= 0 empty system
| l[[ M |  P ]] site
| N1   N2 composition
Figure 1: A Simple Calculus
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Policies). A policy is a ﬁnite subset of Act ∪ Loc. For two policies T1
and T2, we write
T1 enforces T2
whenever T1 ⊆ T2. ￿
Intuitively an agent conforms to a policy T at a given site if
• every action it performs at the site is contained in T
• it will only migrate to sites whose names are in T.
For example, conforming to the policy {info, req, home}, where info, req are actions
and home a location, means that the only actions that will be performed are from the
set {info, req} and migration will only occur, if at all, to the site home. With this
interpretation of policies, our deﬁnition of the predicate enforces is also intuitive; if some
code P conforms to the policy T1 and T1 enforces T2 then P also automatically conforms
to T2.
The purpose of membranes is to enforce such policies on incoming agents. In other
words, at a site l[[M| Q]] wishing to enforce a policy Tin, the membrane M has to decide when
to allow entry to an agent such as goTl.P from another site. There are two possibilities.
• The ﬁrst is to syntactically check the code P against the policy Tin; an implemen-
tation would actually expect the agent to arrive with a proof of this fact, and this
proof would be checked.
• The second would be to trust the agent that its code P conforms to the stated T
and therefore only check that this conforms to the entry policy Tin. Assuming that
checking one policy against another is more eﬃcient than the code analysis, this
would make entry formalities much easier.
Deciding on when to apply the second possibility presupposes a trust management frame-
work for systems, which is the topic of much current research. To simplify matters, here
we simply assume that each site contains, as part of its membrane, a record of the level of
trust it has in other sites. Moreover, we assume only three possible levels: bad,unknown
and good. Intuitively, a site is good/bad if it behaves in a reliable/unreliable way, i.e. it
does/doesn’t properly calculate digests. On the other hand, a site tagged as unknown canSECURITY POLICIES AS MEMBRANES IN SYSTEMS FOR GLOBAL COMPUTING 5
(r-act) l[[ M |  a.P | Q ]] → l[[ M |  P |Q ]]
(r-par)
N1 → N′
1
N1   N2 → N′
1   N2
(r-struct)
N ≡ N1 N1 → N′
1 N′
1 ≡ N′
N → N′
(r-mig) k[[ Mk |  goTl.P | Q ]]   l[[ Ml |  R ]] →
k[[ Mk |  Q ]]   l[[ Ml |  P |R ]] if Ml ⊢k
T P
Figure 2: The reduction relation
l[[ M |  P | nil ]] ≡ l[[ M |  P ]] N   0 ≡ N
l[[ M |  P | Q ]] ≡ l[[ M |  Q | P ]] N1   N2 ≡ N2   N1
l[[ M |  (P |Q) | R ]] ≡ l[[ M |  P | (Q|R) ]] (N1   N2)   N3 ≡ N1   (N2   N3)
l[[ M |  !P |Q ]] ≡ l[[ M |  P |!P |Q ]]
Figure 3: The structural equivalence
behave in a non speciﬁed way; thus, for the sake of security, it will be considered as bad.
In a more realistic scenario, it would be possible to reﬁne unknown to either good or bad,
upon collection of enough evidence to consider it reliable or not. For the sake of simplicity,
we do not model this framework here.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Membranes). A membrane M is a pair (Mt,Mp) where
• Mt is a partial function from Loc to {unknown,good,bad}
• Mp is a policy ￿
2.2. The Operational Semantics.
Having deﬁned both policies and membranes, we now give an operational semantics for the
calculus, which formalises the above discussion on how to manage agent migration. This is
given as a binary relation N → N′ over systems; it is deﬁned to be the least relation which
satisﬁes the rules in Figure 2. Rule (r-act) says that the agent a.P running in parallel
with other code in site l, such as Q, can perform the action a; note that the semantics does
not record the occurrence of a. (r-par) and (r-struct) are standard. The ﬁrst allows
reductions within parallel components, while the second says that reductions are relative
to a structural equivalence; the rules deﬁning this equivalence are given in Figure 3. The
interesting reduction rule is the last one, (r-mig), governing migration; the agent goTl.P
can migrate from site k to site l provided the predicate Ml ⊢k
T P is true. This ‘enabling’
predicate formalises our discussion above on the role of the membrane Ml, and requires in6 D. GORLA, M. HENNESSY, AND V. SASSONE
(tc-empty)
⊢ nil : T
(tc-act)
⊢ P : T
⊢ a.P : T
a ∈ T
(tc-mig)
⊢ P : T′
⊢ goT′l.P : T
l ∈ T
(tc-repl)
⊢ P : T
⊢ !P : T
(tc-par)
⊢ P : T ⊢ Q : T
⊢ P | Q : T
Figure 4: Typechecking incoming agents
turn a notion of code P satisfying a policy T,
⊢ P : T
With such a notion, we can then deﬁne Ml ⊢k
T P to be:
if Ml
t(k) = good then (T enforces Mp
l ) else ⊢ P : Mp
l (2.1)
In other words, if the target site l trusts the source site k, it trusts that the professed policy
T is a faithful reﬂection of the behaviour of the incoming agent P, and then entry is gained
provided that T enforces the entry policy Mp
l (i.e., in this case, T ⊆ Mp
l ). Otherwise, if k
can not be trusted, then the entire incoming code P has to be checked to ensure that it
conforms to the entry policy, as expressed by the predicate ⊢ P : Mp
l .
In Figure 4 we describe a simple inference system for checking that agents conform to
policies, i.e. to infer judgements of the form ⊢ P : T. Rule (tc-empty) simply says that
the empty agent nil satisﬁes all policies. (tc-act) is also straightforward; a.P satisﬁes a
policy T and if a is allowed by T, and the residual P satisﬁes T. The rule (tc-par) says
that to check P | Q it is suﬃcient to check P and Q separately, and similarly for replicated
agents. The most interesting rule is (tc-mig), which checks goT′l.P. This not only checks
that migration to l is allowed by the policy, that is l ∈ T, but it also checks that the code to
be spawned there, P, conforms to the associated professed policy T′. In some sense, if the
agent goT′l.P is allowed entry into a site k, then k assumes responsibility for any promises
that it makes about conformance to policies.
2.3. Safety.
We have just outlined a reduction semantics in which sites seek to enforce policies either
by directly checking the code of incoming agents against entry policies, or more simply by
checking the professed policy of trusted agents. The extent to which this strategy works
depends, not surprisingly, on the quality of a site’s trust management.
Example 2.1. Let home be a site name with the following trust function
Mh
t : {alice,bob,secure}  → good .
Consider the system
N
△ = home[[ Mh |  Ph ]]   bob[[ Mb |  Pb ]]   alice[[ Ma |  Pa ]]   secure[[ Ms |  Ps ]]SECURITY POLICIES AS MEMBRANES IN SYSTEMS FOR GLOBAL COMPUTING 7
in which the entry policy of home, Mp
h, is {info, req, secure}, and that of secure, Mp
s,
is {give, home}. Since Mh
t (bob) = good, agents migrating from bob to home are trusted
and only their digests are checked against the entry policy Mp
h. So, if Pb contains the agent
goT1home.(take.Q)
where T1 enforces Mp
h, then the entry policy of home will be transgressed.
As another example, suppose alice, again trusted by home, contains the agent
goT1home.(info.goT2secure.(take.Q))
where T2 is some policy which enforces the entry policy of secure, Mp
s. Again because
T1 enforces Mp
h , the migration is allowed from alice to home, and moreover the incoming
agent conforms to the policy demanded of home. The second migration of the agent is also
successful if secure trusts home: Ms
t (home) = good and therefore only the digest T2 is
checked against the entry policy of secure. We then have the reduction
N − →∗ home[[...]]   bob[[...]]   alice[[...]]   secure[[ Ms |  take.Q | Ps ]]
in which now the entry policy of secure has been foiled. ￿
The problem in this example is that the trust knowledge of home is faulty; it trusts in
sites which do not properly ensure that professed policies are enforced. Let us divide the
sites into trustworthy and otherwise. This bipartition could be stored in an external record
stating which nodes are trustworthy (i.e. typechecked) and which ones are not. However,
for economy, we prefer to record this information in the membranes, by demanding that
the trust knowledge at trustworthy sites is a proper reﬂection of this division. This is more
easily deﬁned if we assume the following ordering over trust levels:
unknown <: bad and unknown <: good
This reﬂects the intuitive idea that sites classiﬁed as unknown may, perhaps with further
information, be subsequently classiﬁed either as good or bad. On the other hand, good or
bad cannot be further reﬁned; sites classiﬁed as either, will not be reclassiﬁed.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Trustworthy sites and Coherent systems). In a system N, the site k is
trustworthy if Mk
t (k) = good. N is coherent if Mk
t (l) <: Ml
t(l) for every trustworthy site k.
￿
Thus, if a trustworthy site k believes that a site l can be trusted (i.e., Mk
t (l) = good),
then l is indeed trustworthy (as represented by Ml
t(l) = good). Similarly, if it believes l to
be bad, then l is indeed bad. The only uncertainty is when k classiﬁes l as unknown: then l
may be either good or bad. Of course, in coherent systems we expect sites which have been
classiﬁed as trustworthy to act in a trustworthy manner, which amounts to saying that code
running at such a k must have at one time gained entry there by satisfying the entry policy.
Note that by using policies as in Deﬁnition 2.1, if P satisﬁes an entry policy Mp
k, then it
continues to satisfy the policy while running at k (cf. Theorem 2.2 below).8 D. GORLA, M. HENNESSY, AND V. SASSONE
(wf-empty)
⊢ 0 : ok
(wf-g.site)
⊢ P : Mp
⊢ l[[ M |  P ]] : ok
l trustworthy
(wf-par)
⊢ N1 : ok, ⊢ N2 : ok
⊢ N1   N2 : ok
(wf-u.site)
⊢ l[[ M |  P ]] : ok
l not trustworthy
Figure 5: Well-formed systems
This property of coherent systems, which we call well-formedness, can therefore be
checked syntactically. In Figure 5, we give the set of rules for deriving the judgement
⊢ N : ok
of well-formedness of N. There are only two interesting rules. Firstly, (wf-g.site) says that
l[[ M |  P ]] is well-formed whenever l is trustworthy and ⊢ P : Mp. There is a subtlety here;
this not only means that P conforms to the policy Mp, but also that any digests proﬀered
by agents in P can also be trusted. The second relevant rule is (wf-u.site), for typing
unknown sites: here there is no need to check the resident code, as agents emigrating from
such sites will not be trusted.
Example 2.2. (Example 2.1 continued.) Let us now re-examine the system N in Exam-
ple 2.1. Suppose home is trustworthy, that is Mh
t (home) = good. Then, if N is to be
coherent, it is necessary for each of the sites bob, alice and secure also to be trustwor-
thy. Consequently, N cannot be well-formed. For example, to derive ⊢ N : ok it would be
necessary to derive
⊢ goT1home.(take.Q) : Mp
b
where Mp
b is the entry policy of bob. But this requires the judgement
⊢ take.Q : T1
where T1 enforces Mp
h. Since take  ∈ Mp
h, this is not possible.
One can also check that the code running at alice stops the system from being well-
formed. Establishing ⊢ N : ok would also require the judgement
⊢ goT1home.(info.goT2secure.(take.Q)) : Mp
a
which in turn, eventually, requires
⊢ take.Q : T2
for some T2 such that T2 enforces Mp
s; this is impossible, again because take is not in Mp
s.
￿
In well-formed systems we know that entry policies have been respected. So one way of
demonstrating that our reduction strategy correctly enforces these policies is to prove that
• system well-formedness is preserved by reduction
• only legal computations take place within trustworthy sitesSECURITY POLICIES AS MEMBRANES IN SYSTEMS FOR GLOBAL COMPUTING 9
(lts-act)
a.P
a → P
(lts-mig)
goTl.P
l → nil
(lts-repl)
P | !P
α → P′
!P
α → P′
(lts-par)
P1
α → P′
1
P1 | P2
α → P′
1 | P2
P2 | P1
α → P2 | P′
1
Figure 6: A Labelled Transition System
The ﬁrst requirement is straightforward to formalize:
Theorem 2.1 (Subject Reduction). If ⊢ N : ok and N → N′, then ⊢ N′ : ok.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
To formalise the second requirement we need some notion of the computations of an
agent. With this in mind, we ﬁrst deﬁne a labelled transition system between agents, which
details the immediate actions an agent can perform, and the residual of those actions. The
rules for the judgements
P
α → Q
where we let α to range over Act∪Loc, are given in Figure 6, and are all straightforward.
These judgements are then extended to
P
σ → Q
where σ ranges over (Act ∪ Loc)∗, in the standard manner: σ = α1,...,αk, when there
exists P0,...,Pk such that P = P0
α1 → ...
αk → Pk = P′. Finally, let act(σ) denote the set of
all elements of Act ∪ Loc occurring in σ.
Theorem 2.2 (Safety). Let N be a well-formed system. Then, for every trustworthy site
l[[ M |  P ]] in N, P
σ → P′ implies that act(σ) enforces Mp.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
3. Entry Policies
The calculus of the previous section is based on a simple notion of entry policies, namely
ﬁnite sets of actions and location names. An agent conforms to such a policy T at a site
if it only executes actions in T before migrating to some location in T. However both the
syntax and the semantics of the calculus are completely parametric on policies. All that is
required of the collection of policies is
• a binary relation T1 enforces T2 between them
• a binary relation ⊢ P : T indicating that the code P conforms to the policy T.
With any collection of policies, endowed with two such relations, we can deﬁne the predicate
M ⊢k
T P as in (2.1) above, and thereby get a reduction semantics for the calculus. In this
section we investigate two variations on the notion of entry policies and discuss the extent
to which we can prove that the reduction strategy correctly implements them.10 D. GORLA, M. HENNESSY, AND V. SASSONE
3.1. Multisets as Entry Policies.
The policies of the previous section only express the legal actions agents may perform at
a site. However in many situations more restrictive policies are desirable. To clarify this
point, consider the following example.
Example 3.1. Let mail serv be the site name of a mail server with the following entry
policy Mp
ms:
{list,send,retr,del,reset,quit}
The server accepts client agents performing requests for listing mail messages, send-
ing/retrieving/deleting messages, resetting the mailbox and quitting. Now, consider the
system
N
△
= mail serv[[ Mms |  Pms ]]   spam[[ Ms |  goTmail serv.(!send) ]]
where T = {send}. According to the typechecking of Figure 4, we have that
⊢ !send : Mp
ms
However, the agent is a spamming virus and, in practical implementations, should be re-
jected by mail serv. ￿
In such scenarios it would be more suitable for policies to be able to ﬁx an upper-bound
over the number of messages sent. This can be achieved in our setting by changing policies
from sets of agent actions to multisets of actions. Consequently, predicate enforces is now
multiset inclusion.
First let us ﬁx some notation. We can view a multiset as a set equipped with an
occurrence function, that associates a natural number to each element of the set. To model
permanent resources, we also allow the occurrence function to associate ω to an element
with an inﬁnite number of occurrences in the multiset. Notationally, eω stands for an
element e occurring inﬁnitely many times in a multiset. This notation is extended to sets
and multisets; for any set/multiset E, we let Eω to denote the multiset {eω : e ∈ E}.
Example 3.2. (Example 3.1 continued.) Coming back to Example 3.1, it would be suﬃ-
cient to deﬁne Mp
ms to be {...,sendK,...} where K is a reasonable constant. In this way, an
agent can only send at most K messages in each session; if it wants to send more messages,
it has to disconnect from mail serv (i.e. leave it) and then reconnect again (i.e. immigrate
again later on). In practice, this would prevent major spamming attacks, because the time
spent for login/logout operations would radically slow down the spam propagation. ￿
The theory presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 can be adapted to the case where policies
are multisets of actions. The judgment ⊢ P : T is redeﬁned in Figure 7, where operator ∪
stands for multiset union. The key rules are (tc-act), (tc-par) and (tc-repl). The ﬁrst
two properly decrease the type satisﬁed when typechecking sub-agents. The third one is
needed because recursive agents can be, in general, freely unfolded; hence, the actions they
intend to locally perform can be iterated arbitrarily many times. For instance, agent
P
△
= !sendSECURITY POLICIES AS MEMBRANES IN SYSTEMS FOR GLOBAL COMPUTING 11
(tc-empty)
⊢ nil : T
(tc-act)
⊢ P : T
⊢ a.P : T ∪ {a}
(tc-mig)
⊢ P : T′
⊢ goT′l.P : T ∪ {l}
(tc-par)
⊢ P : T1 ⊢ Q : T2
⊢ P | Q : T1 ∪ T2
(tc-repl)
⊢ P : T
⊢ !P : T′ T
ω enforces T
′
Figure 7: Typechecking with policies as Multisets
satisﬁes policy T
△
= {sendω}. Notice that the new policy satisfaction judgement prevents
the spamming virus of Example 3.1 from typechecking against the policy of mail serv
deﬁned in Example 3.2.
The analysis of the previous section can also be repeated here but an appropriate
notion of well-formed system is more diﬃcult to formulate. The basic problem stems from
the diﬀerence between entry policies and resident policies. The fact that all agents who
have ever entered a site l respects an entry policy Mp gives no guarantees as to whether the
joint eﬀect with the code currently occupying the site l also satisﬁes Mp. For instance, in the
terms of Example 3.2, mail serv ensures that each incoming agent can only send at most K
messages. Nevertheless, two such agents, having gained entry and now running concurrently
at mail serv, can legally send – jointly – up to 2K messages. It is therefore necessary to
formulate well-formedness in terms of the individual threads of the code currently executing
at a site. Let us say P is a thread if it is not of the form P1 |P2. Note that every agent P can
be written in the form of P1|...|Pn,n ≥ 1, where each Pi is a thread. So the well-formedness
judgment is modiﬁed by replacing rule (wf-g.site) in Figure 5 as below.
(wf-g.sitem)
∀i. (Pi a thread and ⊢ Pi : Mp)
⊢ l[[ M |  P1|...|Pn ]] : ok
l trustworthy
Theorem 3.1 (Subject Reduction for multiset policies). If ⊢ N : ok and N → N′, then
⊢ N′ : ok.
Proof. Similar to that of Theorem 2.1. The necessary changes are outlined in Appendix A.2.
The statement of safety must be changed to reﬂect the focus on individual threads
rather than agents. Moreover, we must keep into account also multiple occurrences of
actions in a trace; thus, we let act(σ) return a multiset formed by all the actions occurring
in σ.
Theorem 3.2 (Safety for multiset policies). Let N be a well-formed system. Then, for
every trustworthy site l[[ M |  P1|...|Pn ]] in N, where each Pi is a thread, Pi
σ → P′
i implies
that act(σ) enforces Mp.
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3.2. Finite Automata as Entry Policies.
A second limitation of the setting presented in Section 2 is that policies will sometimes need
to prescribe a precise order for executing legal actions. This is very common in client/server
interactions, where a precise protocol (i.e. a pattern of message exchange) must be respected.
To this end we deﬁne policies as deterministic ﬁnite automata (DFAs, for short).
Example 3.3. Let us consider Example 3.1 again. Usually, mail servers requires a prelim-
inary authentication phase to give access to mail services. To express this fact, we could
implement the entry policy of mail serv, Mp
ms, to be the automaton associated to the
regular expression below.
usr.pwd.(list + send + retr + del + reset)∗.quit
The server accepts client requests only upon authentication, via a username/password mech-
anism. Moreover, the policy imposes that each session is regularly committed by requiring
that each sequence of actions is terminated by quit. This could be needed to save the
status of the transaction and avoid inconsistencies. ￿
We now give the formal deﬁnitions needed to adapt the theory developed in Section 2.
We start by deﬁning a DFA, the language associated to it, the enforces predicate between
DFAs and a way for an agent to satisfy a DFA. As usual [HU79], a DFA is a quintuple
A
△
= (S,Σ,s0,F,δ) where
• S is a ﬁnite set of states;
• Σ is the input alphabet;
• s0 ∈ S is a reserved state, called the starting state;
• ∅ ⊂ F ⊆ S is the set of ﬁnal states (also called accepting states);
• δ : S × Σ → S is the transition relation.
In our framework, the alphabet of the DFAs considered is a ﬁnite subset of Act ∪ Loc.
Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we shall always assume that the DFAs in this paper
are minimal.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (DFA Acceptance and Enforcement). Let A be a DFA. Then
• Acps(A) contains all the σ ∈ Σ∗ such that σ leads A from state s to a ﬁnal state;
• Acp(A) is deﬁned to be Acps0(A);
• A1 enforces A2 holds true whenever Acp(A1) ⊆ Acp(A2). ￿
Notice that, as expected, there is an eﬃcient way to extablish A1 enforces A2, once
given the automata A1 and A2 (see Proposition A.2 in Appendix A.3). We now formally
describe the language associated to an agent by exploiting the notion of concurrent regular
expressions (CRE, for short) introduced in [GR92] to model concurrent processes. For our
purposes, the following subset of CRE suﬃces:
e ::= ǫ | α | e1.e2 | e1 ⊙ e2 | e⊗
ǫ denotes the empty sequence of characters, α ranges over Act ∪ Loc, ‘.’ denotes con-
catenation, ⊙ is the interleaving (or shuﬄe) operator and ⊗ is its closure. Intuitively, if e
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e, the language associated to it, written lang(e), can be easily deﬁned; a formal deﬁnition
is recalled in Appendix A.3. Now, given a process P, we easily deﬁne a CRE associated to
it. Formally
CRE(nil)
△ = ǫ CRE(a.P)
△ = a.CRE(P)
CRE(goAl.P)
△
= l CRE(P1 |P2)
△
= CRE(P1) ⊙ CRE(P2)
CRE(!P)
△
= CRE(P)⊗
Deﬁnition 3.2 (DFA Satisfaction). An agent P satisﬁes the DFA A, written ⊢ P : A, if
lang(CRE(P)) ⊆ Acp(A), and ⊢ Q : A′ holds for every subagent of P of the form goA′l.Q.
￿
In Proposition A.2, we prove that DFA satisfaction is decidable, although extremely
hard to establish. This substantiate our hypothesis that verifying digests is preferable to
inspecting the full code from the point of view computational complexity. We are now
ready to state the soundness of this variation. It simply consists in ﬁnding a proper notion
of well-formed systems. As in Section 3.1, the entry policy can only express properties
of single threads, instead of coalitions of threads hosted at a site. Thus, we modiﬁy rule
(wf-g.site) from Figure 5 to:
(wf-g.siteA)
∀i. Pi a thread and ∃s ∈ S . lang(CRE(Pi)) ⊆ Acps(Mp)
⊢ l[[ M |  P1|...|Pn ]] : ok
l trustworthy
This essentially requires that the languages associated to each of the threads in l are suﬃxes
of words accepted by Mp (cf. Theorem 3.4 below). Since this may appear quite weak, it is
worth remarking that the well-formedness predicate is just a ‘consistency’ check, a way to
express that the agent is in a state from where it will respect the policy of l. The soundness
theorems are reported below and are proved in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 3.3 (Subject Reduction for automata policies). If ⊢ N : ok and N → N′, then
⊢ N′ : ok.
Theorem 3.4 (Safety for automata policies). Let N be a well-formed system. Then, for
every trustworthy site l[[M| P1|...|Pn]] in N, where each Pi is a thread, σ ∈ lang(CRE(Pi))
implies that there exists some σ′ ∈ Acp(Mp) such that σ′ = σ′′σ, for some σ′′.
We conclude this section with two interesting properties enforceable by using automata.
Example 3.4. [Lock/Unlock] We have two actions, lock and unlock, with the constraint
that each lock must be always followed by an unlock. Let Σl = Σ − {lock} and Σu =
Σ−{lock,unlock}. Thus, the desired policy (written using a regular expression formalism)
is
(Σ∗
l.(lock.Σ∗
u.unlock)∗)∗ ￿14 D. GORLA, M. HENNESSY, AND V. SASSONE
Example 3.5. [Secrecy] Let secret be a secret action; we require that, whenever an
agent performs secret, it cannot migrate anymore (this policy enforces that agents having
performed secret always remain co-located). Let Σs = Σ − {secret} and Σg = Σ − Loc;
thus, the desired policy is
Σ∗
s.(ǫ + secret.Σ∗
g) ￿
4. Resident Policies
Here we change the intended interpretation of policies. In the previous section a policy
dictated the proposed behaviour of an agent prior to execution in a site, at the point of
entry. This implied that safety in well-formed systems was a thread-wise property (see rules
(wf-g.siteM) and (wf-g.siteA)). Here we focus on policies which are intended to describe
the permitted (coalitional) behaviour of agents during execution at a site. Nevertheless
these resident policies are still used to determine whether a new agent is allowed access to
the site in question; entry will only be permitted if the addition of this incoming agent to
the code currently executing at the site does not violate the policy.
Let us consider an example to illustrate the diﬀerence between entry and resident
policies.
Example 4.1. Let licence serv be the site name of a server that makes available K
licences to download and install a software product. The distribution policy is based on a
queue: the ﬁrst K agents landing in the site are granted the licence, the following ones are
denied. The policy of the server should be Mp
s △
= {get licenceK}. However if this policy
is interpreted as an entry policy, applying the theory of Section 3.1, then the system grants
at most K licences to each incoming agent. Moreover this situation continues indeﬁnitely,
eﬀectively handing out licences to all incoming agents. ￿
We wish to re-interpret the policies of the previous section as resident policies and here
we outline two diﬀerent schemes for enforcing such policies. For simplicity we conﬁne our
attention to one kind of policy, that of multisets.
4.1. Static membranes.
Our ﬁrst scheme is conservative in the sense that many of the concepts developed in Sec-
tion 3.1 for entry policies can be redeployed. Let us reconsider rule (r-mig) from Figure 2.
There, the membrane Ml only takes into consideration the incoming code P, and its digest
T, when deciding on entry, via the predicate Ml ⊢k
T P. But if the membrane is to enforce
a resident policy, then it must also take into account the contribution of the code already
running in l, namely R. To do so we need a mechanism for joining policies, such as those
of the incoming P and the resident R in rule (r-mig). So let us assume that the set of
policies, with the relation enforces is a partial order in which every pair of elements T1
and T2 has a least upper bound, denoted T1 ⊔ T2. For multiset policies this is the case as ⊔
is simply multiset union. In addition we need to be able to calculate the (minimal) policySECURITY POLICIES AS MEMBRANES IN SYSTEMS FOR GLOBAL COMPUTING 15
(ti-empty)
￿ nil : ∅
(ti-act)
￿ P : T
￿ a.P : T ∪ {a}
(ti-mig)
￿ P : T′
￿ goTl.P : {l}
T
′ enforces T
(ti-repl)
￿ P : T
￿ !P : Tω
(ti-par)
￿ P : T1 ￿ Q : T2
￿ P | Q : T1 ∪ T2
Figure 8: Type inference for agents with policies as multisets
which a process R satisﬁes; let us denote this as pol(R). For multiset policies we can adjust
the rules in Figure 7, essentially by eliminating weakening, to perform this calculation; the
resulting rules are given in Figure 8, with judgements of the form ￿ P : T.
Lemma 4.1.
• For every P, there is at most one T such that ￿ P : T.
• ⊢ P : T implies that there exists some policy T′ such that T′ enforces T and
￿ P : T′.
Proof. The ﬁrst statement is proved by structural induction on P; the second by induction
on the derivation ⊢ P : T.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Deﬁne the partial function pol( ) by letting pol(P) be the unique policy
such that ￿ P : T, if it exists. ￿
With these extra concepts we can now change rule (r-mig) in Figure 2 to take the
current resident code into account. It is suﬃcient to change the side condition, from Ml ⊢k
T
P to Ml,R ⊢k
T P, where this latter is deﬁned to be
if Ml
t(k) = good then (T⊔ pol(R)) enforces Mp
l else ⊢ P | R : Mp
l
Here if only the digest needs to be checked then we compare T⊔ pol(R), that is the result
of adding the digest to the policy of the resident code R, against the resident policy Mp
l.
On the other hand if the source site is untrusted we then need to analyse the incoming
code in parallel with the resident code R. It should be clear that the theory developed in
Section 3.1 is readily adapted to this revised reduction semantics. In particular the Subject
Reduction and Safety theorems remain true; we spare the reader the details. However it
should also be clear that this approach to enforcing resident policies has serious practical
drawbacks. An implementation would need to:
(1) freeze and retrieve the current content of the site, namely the agent R;
(2) calculate the minimal policy satisﬁed by R to be merged with P’s digest in order to
check the predicate enforces, or typecheck the composed agent P |R;
(3) reactivate R and, according to the result of the checking phase, activate P.
Even if the language were equipped with a ‘passivation’ operator, as in [SS03], the overall
operation would still be computationally very intensive. Consequently we suggest below
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(wf-g.site)
Θ ⊢ l[[ M |  P ]] : ok
l trustworthy
(pol(P) ⊔ Mp) enforces Θ(l)
(wf-empty)
Θ ⊢ 0 : ok
(wf-u.site)
Θ ⊢ l[[ M |  P ]] : ok
l not trustworthy
(wf-par)
Θ ⊢ N1 : ok, Θ ⊢ N2 : ok
Θ ⊢ N1   N2 : ok
Figure 9: Well-formed systems under Θ
4.2. Dynamic membranes.
In the previous approach we have to repeatedly calculate the policy of the current resident
code each time a new agent requests entry. Here we allow the policy in the membrane to
“decrease,” in order to reﬂect the resources already allocated to the resident code. So at
any particular moment in time the policy currently in the membrane records what resources
remain, for any future agents who may wish to enter; with the entry of each agent there
is a corresponding decrease in the membrane’s policy. Formally we need to change the
migration rule rule (r-mig) to one which not only checks incoming code, or digest, against
the membrane’s policy, but also updates the membrane:
(r-mig′) k[[ Mk |  goTl.P | Q ]]   l[[ Ml |  R ]] →
k[[ Mk |  Q ]]   l[[ c Ml |  P |R ]] if Ml ⊢k
T P ≻ c Ml
where the judgement Ml ⊢k
T P ≻ c Ml is deﬁned as
let T′ =
￿
T if Ml
t(k) = good
pol(P) otherwise
￿
in T′ enforces Mp
l ∧ Mp
l = b Ml
p ⊔ T′ ∧ Ml
t = c Ml
t
First notice that if this migration occurs then the membrane at the target site changes, from
Mp
l to b Ml
p. The latter is obtained from the former by eliminating those resources allocated
to the incoming code P. If the source site, k, is deemed to be good this is calculated via
the incoming digest T; otherwise a direct analysis of the code P is required, to calculate
pol(P).
This revised schema is more reasonable from an implementation point of view, but its
soundness is more diﬃcult to formalise and prove. As a computation proceeds no permanent
record is kept in the system of the original resident policies at the individual sites. Therefore
well-formedness can only be deﬁned relative to an external record of what the resident
policies were, when the system was initiated. For this purpose we use a function Θ, mapping
trustworthy sites to policies; it is suﬃcient to record the original polices at these sites as we
are not interested in the behaviour elsewhere.
Then we can deﬁne the notion of well-formed systems, relative to such a Θ; this is
written as Θ ⊢ N : ok and the formal deﬁnition is given in Table 9. The crucial rule is
(wf-g.site), for trustworthy sites. If l is such a site then l[[ M |  P ]] is well-formed relative
to the original record Θ if Mp
l ⊔ pol(P) guarantees the original resident policy at l, namely
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Theorem 4.3 (Subject Reduction for resident policies). If Θ ⊢ N : ok and N → N′, then
Θ ⊢ N′ : ok.
Proof. Outlined in Appendix A.4.
The introduction of these external records of the original resident policies also enables
us to give a Safety result.
Theorem 4.4 (Safety for resident policies). Let N be a well-formed system w.r.t. Θ. Then,
for every trustworthy site l[[ M |  P ]] in N, P
σ → P′ implies that act(σ) enforces Θ(l).
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
5. Conclusion and Related Work
We have presented a framework to describe distributed computations of systems involv-
ing migrating agents. The activity of agents entering/running in ‘good’ sites is constrained
by a membrane that implements the layer dedicated to the security of the site. We have
described how membranes can enforce several interesting kind of policies. The basic theory
presented for the simpler case has been reﬁned and tuned throughout the paper to increase
the expressiveness of the framework. Clearly, any other kind of behavioural speciﬁcation of
an agent can be considered a policy. For example, a promising direction could be considering
logical frameworks (by exploiting model checking or proof checkers).
The calculus we have presented is very basic: it is even simpler than CCS [Mil82], as
no synchronization can occur. Clearly, we did not aim at Turing-completeness, but at a
very basic framework in which to focus on the rˆ ole of membranes. We conjecture that, by
suitably advancing the theory presented here, all the ideas can be lifted to more complex
calculi (including, e.g., synchronization, value passing and/or name restriction).
Related Work. In the last decade, several calculi for distributed systems with code
mobility have appeared in literature. In particular, structuring a system as a (ﬂat or
hierarchical) collection of named sites introduced the possibility of dealing with sophisticated
concrete features. For example, sites can be considered as the unity of failure [FG+96,
Ama00], mobility [FG+96, CG00] or access control [HR02, RH03, GP03]. The present
work can be seen as a contribution to the last research line.
As in [GP03], we have presented a scenario where membranes can evolve. However,
the membranes presented in Section 4 only describe ‘what is left’ in the site. On the other
hand, the (dynamically evolving) type of a site in [GP03] always constrains the overall
behaviour of agents in the site and it is modiﬁed upon acquisition/loss of privileges through
computations.
We borrowed from [RH03] the notion of trust between sites, where agents coming from
trusted sites are accepted without any control. Here, we relaxed this choice by examining
the digest of agents coming from trusted sites. Moreover, we have a ﬁxed net of trust; we
believe that, once communication is added to our basic framework, the richer scenario of
[RH03] (where the partial knowledge of a site can evolve during its computation) can be
recovered.
A related paper is [IK01], where authors develop a generic type system that can be
smoothly instantiated to enforce several properties of the π–calculus (dealing with arity18 D. GORLA, M. HENNESSY, AND V. SASSONE
mismatch in communications, deadlock, race control and linearity). They work with one
kind of type, and modify the subtyping relation in order to yield several relevant notions of
safety. The main diﬀerence with our approach is that we have diﬀerent kind of types (and,
thus, diﬀerent type checking mechanisms) for all the variations we propose. It would be
nice to lift our work to a more general framework closer to theirs; we leave this for future
work.
Our work is also related to [NR05]. Policies are described there as deterministic ﬁnite
automata and constrain the access to critical sections in a concurrent functional language.
A type and eﬀect system is provided that guarantees adherence of systems to the policy. In
particular, the sequential behaviour of each thread is guaranteed to respect the policy, and
the interleavings of the threads’ locks to be safe. But unlike our paper [NR05] has no code
migration, and no explicit distribution; thus, only one centralised policy is used.
Membranes as ﬁlters between the computing body of a site and the external environ-
ment are also considered in [FMP04, Bou04, SS03]. There, membranes are computationally
capable objects, and can be considered as a kind of process. They can evolve and com-
municate both with the outer and with the inner part of the associated node, in order to
regulate the life of the node. This diﬀers from our conception of membranes as simple tools
for the veriﬁcation of incoming agents.
To conclude, we remark that our understanding of membranes is radically diﬀerent from
the concept of policies in [ES99]. Indeed, in loc. cit., security automata control the execution
of agents running in a site by in-lined monitoring. This technique consists of accepting
incoming code unconditionally, but blocking at runtime those actions not abiding the site
policy. Clearly, in order to implement the strategy, the execution of each action must be
ﬁltered by the policy. This contrasts with our approach, where membranes are ‘containers’
that regulate the interactions between sites and their environments. The computation
taking place within the site is out of the control of the membrane, which therefore cannot
rely on in-lined monitoring.
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Appendix A. Technical Proofs
We now outline the proofs of the technical results in the paper, section by section.
A.1. Proofs of Section 2.
Lemma A.1 (Subsumption). If ⊢ P : T and T enforces T′, then ⊢ P : T′.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of the judgment ⊢ P : T.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 [Subject Reduction]: The proof is by induction over the in-
ference of N → N′. Notice that trustworthiness is invariant under reduction. Therefore
coherence, which is deﬁned in terms of the trustworthiness of sites, is also preserved by
reduction.
We outline the proof when the inference is deduced using rule (r-mig), a typical exam-
ple. By hypothesis, ⊢ k[[ Mk |  goTl.P | Q ]] : ok; this implies that ⊢ k[[ Mk |  Q ]] : ok. Thus,
we only need to prove that ⊢ l[[ Ml |  R ]] : ok and Ml ⊢k
T P imply ⊢ l[[ Ml |  P |R ]] : ok. We
have two possible situations:
l trustworthy: Judgment ⊢ R : Mp
l holds by hypothesis; judgment ⊢ P : Mp
l is
implied by Ml ⊢k
T P. Indeed, because of the coherence hypothesis, Ml
t(k) <: Mk
t (k).
If Mk
t (k)  = good, then Ml ⊢k
T P is exactly the required ⊢ P : Mp
l . Otherwise, we
know that ⊢ goTl.P : Mp
k ; by rule (tc-mig) this implies that ⊢ P : T. Judgment ⊢
P : Mp
l is obtained by using Lemma A.1, since Ml ⊢k
T P is deﬁned to be T enforces
Mp
l (see (2.1) in Section 2.2). Thus, by using (tc-par), we obtain the desired
⊢ P|R : Mp
l .
l not trustworthy: This case is simple, because rule (wf-u.site) always allows to de-
rive
⊢ l[[ Ml |  P |R ]] : ok.20 D. GORLA, M. HENNESSY, AND V. SASSONE
The case when (r-act) is used is similar, although simpler, and the case when rule (r-par) is
used requires a simple inductive argument. Finally to prove the case when rule (r-struct)
is used, we need to know that coherency of systems is preserved by structual equivalence;
the proof of this fact, which is straightforward, is left to the reader.
Proof of Theorem 2.2 [Safety]: Let l[[ M |  P ]] be a site in N such that P
σ → P′. We
have to prove that act(σ) enforces Mp. The statement is proved by induction over the
length of σ. The base case, when σ = ǫ, is trivial since act(ǫ) = ∅.
So we may assume σ = ασ′ and P
α → P′′ σ′
→ P′. Let us consider P
α → P′′; by induction
on
α → , we can prove that α ∈ Mp and that ⊢ l[[ M |  P′′ ]] : ok. If the transition has been
inferred by using rule (lts-act), then P = a.P′′ and, by rule (wf-g.site), we have that ⊢
a.P′′ : Mp; by deﬁnition of rule (tc-act), we have the desired a ∈ Mp and ⊢ P′′ : Mp. When
(lts-mig) is used the argument is similar, and all other cases follow in a straightforward
manner by induction.
Thus, we can now apply induction on the number of actions performed in P′′ σ′
→ P′
and obtain that act(σ′) enforces Mp. This suﬃcies to conclude that act(σ) = (act(σ′) ∪
{α}) enforces Mp.
A.2. Proofs of Section 3.1.
The proofs given in Appendix A.1 can be easily adapted to the setting in which entry policies
are multisets. We outline only the main changes. First recall that enforces is multiset
inclusion, that judgments ⊢ P : T must be now inferred by using the rules in Figure 7 and
that rule (wf-g.siteM) is used for well-formedness. Then, Lemma A.1 remains true in this
revised setting.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 [Subject Reduction]: A straightforward adaptation of the cor-
responding proof in the previous section. The only signiﬁcant change is to the case when a
replication is unfolded via the rule (r-struct), i.e.
N
△
= l[[ M |  !P | Q ]] ≡ l[[ M |  P | !P | Q ]] → N′′ ≡ N′
By hypothesis, ⊢ !P : Mp; therefore, by deﬁnition of rule (tc-repl), we have that ⊢ P : T
for some T such that Tω enforces Mp. Since T enforces Tω and because of Lemma A.1,
we have that ⊢ l[[ M |  P | !P | Q ]] : ok. By induction, ⊢ N′′ : ok. It is easy to prove that
this suﬃcies to obtain the desired ⊢ N′ : ok.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 [Safety]: From the rule (wf-g.siteM) we know that ⊢ Pi : Mp,
for all i = 1,...,n. We now proceed by induction over |σ|. The base case is trivial. For
the inductive case, we consider σ = ασ′ and Pi
α → P′′
i
σ′
→ P′
i. By induction on
α → , we can
prove that α ∈ Mp and that ⊢ l[[Mt;Mp − {α}| P′′
i ]]. If the transition has been inferred by
using rule (lts-act), then Pi = a.P′′
i and, by rule (wf-g.siteM), we have that ⊢ a.P′′
i : Mp;
by deﬁnition of rule (tc-act), we have the desired Mp = T ∪ {a} and ⊢ P′′ : T. When
(lts-mig) is used the case is simpler, and all other cases follow in a straightforward manner
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Coming back to the main claim, we use the induction and obtain that act(σ′) enforces
Mp − {α}; thus, act(σ) enforces Mp.
A.3. Proofs of Section 3.2.
We start by recalling from [GR92] the formal deﬁnition of the language associated to a
CRE, as follows.
lang(ǫ)
△
= {ǫ}
lang(α)
△
= {α}
lang(e1.e2)
△
= {x1x2 : x1 ∈ lang(e1) ∧ x2 ∈ lang(e2)}
lang(e1 ⊙ e2)
△
= {x1y1    xnyn : x1    xn ∈ lang(e1) ∧ y1    yn ∈ lang(e2)}
lang(e⊗)
△
=
S
i≥0 lang(e)⊗i where L⊗i △
=
￿
{ǫ} if i = 0
L⊗i−1 ⊙ L otherwise
Notice that the deﬁnition of the lang(e1 ⊙e2) hides a trick: the xis and the yis can also be
ǫ. Thus, as expected, we can also consider for interleaving strings of diﬀerent length.
We start by accounting on the complexity of predicate enforces and the satisﬁability
relation when policies are automata. This is stated by the following Proposition.
Proposition A.2.
(1) A1 enforces A2 can be calculated in polynomial time
(2) ⊢ P : A is decidable, but it is super-exponential
Proof.
(1) Let Ai = (Si,Σ,si
0,Fi,δi) and let Li = Acp(Ai). By deﬁnition, we have to check
whether L1 ⊆ L2 or not. This is equivalent to check whether L1 ∩ L2 = ∅. The
following steps have been carried out by following [HU79].
(a) calculate the automaton associated to L2. This can be done in O(|S2|) and the
resulting automaton has |S2| states.
(b) calculate the automaton associated to L1 ∩ L2. This can be done in O(|S1| ×
|S2| × |Σ|) and creates an automaton A with |S1| × |S2| states.
(c) Checking the emptyness of L1 ∩ L2 can be done by using a breath-ﬁrst search
that starts from the starting state of (the graph underlying) A and stops when-
ever a ﬁnal state is reached. If no ﬁnal state is reached, L1 ∩L2 is empty. This
can be done in O(|S1| × |S2| × |Σ|).
Thus, the overall complexity is O(|S1| × |S2| × |Σ|).
(2) It has been proved in [GR92] that each CRE e can be represented by a (labelled)
Petri net, in that the language accepted by the Petri net is lang(e). Now, we can
easily construct a DFA accepting the complement of the language accepted by A
(see item (a) of the previous proof). Now, we can construct the product between
this DFA (that can be seen as a Petri net) and the Petri net associated to CRE(P);
this Petri net accepts lang(CRE(P)) ∩ Acp(A) (see [Pet81]). Now, the emptyness
of this language can be solved with the algorithm for the reachability problem in
the corresponding Petri net. This problem has been proved decidable [May84] and
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We now prove the subject reduction theorem in the setting where types are DFAs. To
this aim, we need to adapt Lemma A.1 and we need a very simple result on the languages
associated to DFAs and processes.
Lemma A.3. If ⊢ P : A and A enforces A′, then ⊢ P : A′.
Proof. By transitivity of subset inclusion.
Lemma A.4.
(1) ασ ∈ Acps(A) if and only if σ ∈ Acpδ(s,α)(A)
(2) If σ ∈ lang(CRE(a.P)) then σ = aσ′ for σ′ ∈ lang(CRE(P)). Viceversa, if σ ∈
lang(CRE(P)), then aσ ∈ lang(CRE(a.P)).
Proof. Trivial.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 [Subject Reduction]: Now ⊢ N : ok relies on rule (wf-g.siteA).
Again, the proof is by induction on the inference of N → N′. We only give the base cases,
because inductive steps can be handled with in a standard way. We only consider the cases
of trustworthy sites; the case for non-trustworthy sites is easier. In what follows, we write
⊢s P : A to mean that ⊢ P : A′, where A′ is the DFA obtained from A by setting s as
starting state.
(r-act): In this case, N = l[[ M |  a.P | Q ]]. By deﬁnition of rule (wf-g.siteA), it
holds that Q = Q1|...|Qk (for Qi threads), ∃s. ⊢s a.P : Mp and ∀i.∃si. ⊢si Qi : Mp.
By deﬁnition, we have that lang(CRE(a.P)) ⊆ Acps(Mp); by Lemma A.4, we have
that lang(CRE(P)) ⊆ Acpδ(s,a)(Mp). This suﬃcies to infer the well-formedness of
N′ = l[[ M |  P | Q ]].
(r-mig): In this case, N = k[[ Mk |  goAl.P | Q ]]   l[[ Ml |  R ]] and Ml ⊢k
A P. We
further identify two sub-cases:
• Ml(k) = good. In this case, because of coherence, we know that ⊢ P : A. More-
over, by deﬁnition of Ml ⊢k
A P, it holds that A enforces Mp
l . By Lemma A.3,
we have that ⊢ P : Mp
l . This suﬃcies to conclude.
• Ml(k)  = good. This case is simpler because Ml ⊢k
A P is deﬁned to be ⊢ P : Mp
l .
Proof of Theorem 3.4 [Safety]: The proof is quite easy. Indeed, by rule (wf-g.siteA),
it holds that ∃si : ⊢si Pi : Mp
l . By deﬁnition, this implies that every σ ∈ lang(CRE(Pi)) is
in Acpsi(Mp
l ). Since the automaton Mp
l is minimal, si is a reachable state from the starting
state s0, say, with a (ﬁnite) string σ′′. Then, by Deﬁnition 3.1 and by Lemma A.4.1, it
holds that σ′′σ ∈ Acp(Mp
l ). This proves the thesis.
A.4. Proofs of Section 4.
We show here the main things to modify to carry out the proofs given in Appendix A.2.
Obviously, judgment ⊢ P : T must be now replaced everywhere with ￿ P : T and, similarly,
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Proof of Theorem 4.3 [Subject Reduction]: The proof is by induction over the infer-
ence of N → N′. Inductive steps are simple; we only give the base steps.
(r-act): By hypothesis, Θ ⊢ l[[ M |  a.P | Q ]] : ok. If l is not trustworthy, the case
is trivial. Otherwise, we know by hypothesis that (pol(a.P | Q) ⊔ Mp) enforces
Θ(l). Now, by deﬁnition of judgment ￿ (and hence of function pol( )) we have that
pol(a.P | Q) = pol(P | Q) ∪ {a}. Hence, (pol(P | Q) ⊔ Mp) enforces Θ(l), as
required.
(r-mig): By hypothesis, Θ ⊢ l[[ Ml |  R ]] : ok; we only consider the case in which l is
trustworthy. Thus, we know that (pol(R) ⊔ Mp
l) enforces Θ(l). By the premise of
rule (r-mig), it holds that Ml ⊢k
T P ≻ c Ml. We have two possible situations:
Ml
t(k) = good: In this case, Ml ⊢k
T P ≻ c Ml is deﬁned to be T enforces Mp
l ∧
Mp
l = b Ml
p ⊔ T ∧ Ml
t = c Ml
t. The fact that Ml
t = c Ml
t is suﬃcient to preserve
coherence. Moreover, by rule (ti-mig), we know that ￿ P : T′ and T′ enforces
T. By rule (ti-par), pol(P|R) = pol(R) ⊔ T′ and (pol(R) ⊔ T′) enforces
(pol(R) ⊔ T). Then, pol(P|R) ⊔ b Ml
p = (pol(R) ⊔ T′ ⊔ b Ml
p) enforces (pol(R) ⊔
T ⊔ b Ml
p) = (pol(R) ⊔ Mp
l) enforces Θ(l), as required.
Ml
t(k)  = good: In this case, the previous proof should be rephrased by using
pol(P) instead of the digest T.
Proof of Theorem 4.4 [Safety]: We prove a slightly more general result, that easily
implies the claim desired.
Let N be a well-formed system w.r.t. Θ. If l[[M| P]] is a trustworthy site of N
such that (pol(P)⊔Mp
l ) = T, then P
σ → P′ implies that act(σ) enforces T.
The proof is by induction over |σ|. The base case is when σ = ǫ and it is trivial. In the
inductive case, we consider σ = ασ′ and P
α → P′′ σ′
→ P′. To start, it is easy to prove that
pol(P′′) ⊔ {α} = pol(P) (A.1)
By transitivity of multiset inclusion and by the claim (A.1) above, (pol(P′′) ⊔ Mp
l ) = T′,
where T = T′⊔{α}. Thus, node l[[Ml| P′′]] is well-formed (and trustworthy). By induction
we therefore have that act(σ′) enforces T′. Hence, act(σ) = act(σ′)⊔{α} enforces T′⊔
{α} = T, as required.
To conclude, the original claim of Theorem 4.4 is obtained from the result just proved
by noticing that, because of well-formedness, T enforces Θ(l).
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